武汉封城六周年：不应放弃追责这场历史性的大灾难
Six Years since the Wuhan Lockdown: Seeking Accountability for a Historic Catastrophe
作者：胡平
By Hu Ping
The English translation follows below.
6年前，也就是2020年的1月23日，凌晨2:30，武汉市政府发布新型肺炎疫情防控第1号通告，于上午10点起进行全市交通管控和封闭管理，居民非必要不得离开武汉——这被简称为“武汉封城”。此时，距离2019年12月31日，官媒人民日报第一次公布武汉发现病毒性肺炎的消息相隔23天。
作家方方在2020年2月27日的日记里写道：“武汉疫情，从最初发现到封城，中间延误二十多天，这是不争的事实。而延误的症结在哪里，究竟是何人因何事，给病毒蔓延提供了时间和空间，而导致武汉史上未有的封城？”
新冠疫情从中国蔓延到全世界，根据世界卫生组织的公开数据，武汉封城将近两个月后的2020年3月19日，疫情已蔓延至150多个国家和地区，全球确诊人数远超中国。这场人类历史上少见的大规模疫情，深刻影响了全球的经济以及政治。而在中国之内，各省市陆续采取严厉的“动态清零”措施，民众生活被严厉管控，人权受损，次生灾害频发，直到2022年12月初，又在没有预案和准备的情况下突然解封，再度造成大量死亡。
截至目前为止，中国政府对武汉封城这件事，基本上是“三不”态度：不主动提起、不再纪念、不做总结评价。距离当下最近的一份有关文件，是2025年4月30日，国务院新闻办发布的《关于新冠疫情防控与病毒溯源的中方行动和立场》白皮书。这份文件主要是反击外部指责，以及强调中国在疫情初期的付出，对封城本身的评价仍然停留在2020—2021年的官方表述，没有任何新的反思或经验教训总结。但对于民间社会来说，我们不应该放弃追责的精神——这样一场人类的大灾难，需要一个历史的交代。
1. 疫情之初，竭力隐瞒的是地方还是中央？
事实上，在武汉封城后，追责之声就曾四起。武汉地方官员首当其冲，成为民众责难的对象。民众追责的第一个问题就是：为什么不及时向公众披露疫情？其中一个重要的背景是：2019年12月30日，武汉市中心医院医生李文亮在微信群中提醒同事注意“SARS类似病毒”，却在四天后被武汉警方约谈训诫。2月7日，感染新冠病毒的李文亮医生去世。
回看当时的一些节点：2020年1月27日下午，武汉市长周先旺接受央视记者专访。周先旺公开承认武汉披露疫情不及时，但话锋一转，周说：“披露不及时，这一点大家要理解，因为它是传染病，传染病有传染病防治法，它必须依法披露，作为地方政府，我获得这个信息以后，授权以后，我才能披露。”
2月12日，武汉市官网“汉网”发表文章透露：“早在疫情发生12月，武汉已将相关情况上报国家卫生部门，专家组一行也深入到武汉调研，给出了初步结论。”（原文题目是《“疫”流而上何不多给武汉市长暖暖心》，但后被删除）
1月28日，在会见世卫总干事谭德塞时，习近平说，这次防疫工作，“我一直亲自指挥，亲自部署”。2月15日出版的中共党媒《求是》刊登了习近平在2月3日中央政治局常委会会议应对新冠病毒疫情工作时的讲话全文。在这个讲话中，习近平说他在1月7日的政治局常委会上就对疫情防控工作提出了要求。这就告诉人们，至迟在1月7日，防疫工作就是由习近平“亲自指挥，亲自部署”了。
中国政治几乎从不透明——习近平1月7日对防疫工作到底提出了什么要求，其具体内容是什么？习近平没有细说，新华社对1月7日那次会议的报道也只字未提。但从常情常理上推测，隐瞒疫情的责任不在地方而在中央。
自2003年SARS事件后，中国政府吸取教训，耗费巨资建立起覆盖全国的传染病与突发公共卫生事件监测信息系统（简称网络直报系统）。“不明原因肺炎”则被列为其监测、报告的重点之一。该系统于2004年4月1日在全国范围内正式启用。另外，中国政府还在2006年制定了《国家突发公共卫生事件应急预案》，以及一系列相关法规。假如在疫情发现之初，中国政府就启动应急机制，采取相应行动，很可能把疫情扼杀于萌芽状态，而这场全球性的新冠疫情大灾难，也很可能被避免。
2. 疫情全球大蔓延，中国政府是否曾误导世界？
今日回望可见，在疫情之初，中国政府发布不实信息和虚假数据，严重地误导了世界卫生组织和各国政府。世卫组织驻华代表高力（Dr. Gauden Galea）曾说，在疫情之初，世卫所知道的就只有中国汇报的信息，包括病毒是否人传人的问题，因此没有及时发出警讯。美国白宫应对疫情小组负责人之一黛博拉·伯克斯（Deborah Birx）则说，当时医学界对中国数据的解读是：情况很严重，但规模小于所有人的预期，不会变成全球大流行。
1月23日武汉封城。后来有人评论说：武汉都封城了，全世界还看不懂？但这种说法是不对的。要知道，在当时，中国政府的宣传口径是：武汉封城是超过世卫要求、付出巨大牺牲、把病毒封死在中国，为全球赢得了时间，境外病例不到1%。这继续严重地误导了国际社会。《柳叶刀》主编霍顿1月24日还说没必要恐慌，世卫不建议旅行限制，美国政府在1月底宣布禁航，则被中国斥为“带头不厚道”。可以说，全世界被中国数据和宣传双重误导。
可以说，造成新冠疫情全球大流行的重要症结，就是在疫情初期，中共当局不准公布疫情，拒绝启动应急机制，错过了把疫情扼杀于萌芽状态的时间窗口，此后又发布不实信息和虚假数据误导国际社会，这就让病毒有机会扩散到全中国，乃至扩散到全世界，从而造成了这场全球性的大灾难。
3. 时隔六年，病毒溯源仍没有答案
直到武汉封城6年后的今天，我们仍无法确定，病毒是自然传播的，还是实验室泄漏的？是自然发生的，还是人工合成？
早在2020年新冠疫情爆发之初，就有很多人怀疑病毒是实验室泄漏。其依据是：大多数专家都认为，新冠病毒的宿主是云南的蝙蝠，如果是病毒自然传播，疫情就应该发生在中国南方，而不该发生在距离云南蝙蝠栖居地一、两千公里之外的武汉。另外，武汉病毒所的实验室存有世界上最大数量的蝙蝠病毒样本。疫情既然是在武汉爆发的，所以病毒最可能就来自实验室。另外，科学家早就发现，与其它和SARS相关的冠状病毒相比，新冠病毒（SARS-CoV-2）有一大特点，那就是在其刺突中具有独特的弗林蛋白酶切割位点（furin cleavage sites）。而武汉的病毒研究所早就在进行相关的功能增进研究。
2003年SARS疫情爆发，专家们只用了5个月就找到了直接传染源果子狸。而这次新冠疫情过去6年多了，却还未找到直接传染源的动物。新冠病毒到底来自哪里？科学界尚有疑问，且并未完全排除实验室泄漏的可能性。而中国政府拒绝外国专家深入调查，封锁资讯，形同“此地无银三百两”，在外界看来，就有了欲盖弥彰的味道。有一点可以确定，那就是在疫情初期，中国政府曾隐瞒真相，发布不实信息和虚假数据，严重地违反了《国际卫生条例》，就这一点来说，也必须向中国政府追责。
4. 中国新冠疫情死亡人数至今成谜
世界卫生组织汇总的各国报告数据显示，截至2026年1月中旬左右，全球累计确认新冠病毒造成的死亡人数约为710万人。中国政府报告并由世卫汇总的中国死亡人数则是12万。
12万这个数据明显不靠谱，没人会信。倒是中国疾控中心流行病学首席专家吴尊友讲到了两个相关数据，给出了不同的死亡数据。吴尊友在2023年1月21日发文说，中国从2022年12月6日解封后已经有80%的人口感染过新冠病毒。在2月9日的新闻发布会上，吴尊友说，新冠病毒的病死率2022年12月份是0.08%，那么中国在2022年12月6日解封以来两个月，感染人数大约是：14亿×80%=11.2亿，病死人数就大约是：11.2亿×0.08%=89.6万。
不过，89.6万这个死亡数据可能仍然偏低。因为吴尊友说的2022年12月份新冠病死率0.08%这个数据，是国际平均病死率，由于在这段时期中国的情况和其他国家的情况有着很大的差别，因此，我们不能把其他国家的平均病死率，直接当成中国的病死率。
导致中国的病死率更高的两个主要原因是：第一，中国的国产疫苗效力相对比较低；第二，在2022年12月解封之前，中国人感染过新冠的人相当少，但在2022年12月这波疫情中，其它国家的人大多是再次感染，故而病死率比较低，唯有中国人，基本上都是首次感染。这两条加在一起，就造成中国人可能最缺乏群体免疫力的局面，中国成了免疫洼地。面对同一种病毒，中国人的免疫力要比其它国家低得多，病死率也很可能比国际平均病死率高得多。所以说，中国的新冠死亡人数绝不止89.6万，而很可能比这个数字高若干倍。
因为外界无从获得中国新冠死亡的可靠数据，一个替代方法是，我们可以根据额外死亡的人数，大致推算出新冠死亡的人数。所谓额外死亡人数，是用某段时期的实际死亡人数，减去以过去数据为基础预测出的同期死亡人数而得。当然，额外死亡人数并不直接等于新冠死亡人数。因为在这中间，除了新冠导致的死亡之外，还有受医疗挤兑影响无法及时就医而死于新冠以外疾病的，还有因外出受限等生活习惯变化造成原有慢性病恶化而死去的，还有因经济困难而自杀的，等等。与此同时，在疫情封控时期，有些死亡又会减少，例如开车坐车的人大量减少，交通事故造成的死亡会减少。但是毕竟，在新冠死亡数据缺少统计或秘而不宣的情况下，额外死亡人数给我们推算新冠死亡人数提供了重要的依据。研究传染病流行情况，常常要采用这种方法。
在中国，要了解一段期间内的死亡人数，有一个办法，那就是查看尸体火化数据。中国禁止土葬，死人一般都是火化，而各个火葬场的尸体火化数据是有记录的。当然，在实际上，也有些地方是把死人土葬。尤其是在疫情海啸期间，火葬场不堪重负，因此在广大农村，有不少地方的农民是把死者就地土葬，还有自己搭起架子把尸体火化的，这些死者都没送进火葬场，因此不在火葬场火化的统计数字之内。但尽管如此，查看火葬场尸体火化数据仍然是我们了解死亡人数、从而推算出额外死亡人数、再进而估算出新冠死亡人数的重要依据。
2023年4月13日，《华尔街日报》刊文说，该报调查发现，中国30多个省、市或区，通常每季度发布一次的尸体火化数量的官方报告要么消失了，要么没有按时更新。
不过，不知是刻意为之还是出于疏忽，有个别地方的尸体火化数据还是发布出来了，立刻引起了有心人的注意；虽然这些数据随后又删除了，但有心人留下了截图。以下为几张截图的说明：
1、2023年7月17日，财新发表记者向凯的文章“2023年一季度浙江省火化遗体数同比增长72.7%”。文章引用浙江省民政厅公布的2023年一季度的统计数据。其中，火化尸体数达17.1万具；相比去年同期的9.9万具，增长高达72%。
2、有网友查到河南省县级市长垣市民政局的“2023上半年年中工作总结”。其中明言，该市2023年1-6月共火化遗体1184具，较去年同期664具增加520具，同比增长78.3%。
3、又有网民查到广东惠东县广东民政局的“2022年上半年工作总结”以及“2023年上半年工作总结”。这两份文件提到，2022年1-5月，县殡仪馆共完成火化遗体2245具，其中本县户籍的845具；而2023年1-5月，县殡仪馆共完成火化遗体4804具。按照这个数据计算，2023年1-5月火化遗体数比去年同期增长114.0%。
按照上面基于三个地方泄漏的尸体火化数据进行的推算，中国在疫情期间——主要是在疫情海啸期间——即2022年12月到2023年1月期间——的额外死亡人数，至少是400万，多则达595万。刨除掉其中非新冠死亡人数，再加上从2019年12月疫情发生到2022年12月疫情海啸之前死于新冠病毒的人数，那是一个巨大的数目，按比例算也是在全球名列前茅。
本期推荐档案：
胡平：《新冠肺炎浩劫——一场本来完全可以避免的大灾难》，台湾允晨文化出版，2024年8月。
【本文为中国民间档案馆首发，转载时请务必在正文之前注明“本文首发于中国民间档案馆”，并加上原文在中国民间档案馆网站或者中国民间档案馆Substack的链接。】
【作者观点不代表中国民间档案馆立场。】
Six Years since the Wuhan Lockdown: Seeking Accountability for a Historic Catastrophe
By Hu Ping
Six years ago, at 2:30 a.m. on January 23, 2020, the Wuhan municipal government issued its first announcement regarding the prevention and control of what came to be known as COVID-19. It declared that, effective 10:00 a.m. that day, all city transportation would be suspended and the city closed, with residents prohibited from leaving unless absolutely necessary. This event, now known as the Wuhan lockdown, occurred 23 days after the state-run People’s Daily first reported the discovery of the new virus in Wuhan on December 31, 2019.
In her diary entry on February 27, 2020, the writer Fang Fang wrote: “It is an indisputable fact that over twenty days were lost between the initial discovery of the virus and Wuhan’s lockdown. Where was the crux of this delay? Exactly who, and for what reason, provided the virus the time and space to spread, leading to a lockdown unprecedented in Wuhan’s history?”
The COVID-19 pandemic eventually spread from China to the entire world. According to public data from the World Health Organization (WHO), by March 19, 2020—nearly two months after the Wuhan lockdown began—the virus had reached over 150 countries and regions, and the number of global cases far exceeded those within China. This rare and massive pandemic profoundly reshaped global economics and politics. Within China, provinces and cities implemented draconian “dynamic zero-COVID” measures, resulting in severe restrictions on daily life, human rights violations, and frequent secondary disasters. Finally, in early December 2022, the Chinese government abruptly lifted the lockdown without any contingency plans or preparation, leading to a massive wave of deaths.
To date, the Chinese government’s attitude toward the Wuhan lockdown is denial: no mentions, no commemorations, and no review or evaluations. The most recent official document is a white paper titled “China’s Actions and Position on COVID-19 Prevention, Control, and Virus Tracing,” released by the State Council Information Office on April 30, 2025. This document primarily serves to counter external criticism and highlight China’s early contributions; its evaluation of the lockdown itself remains unchanged from the official rhetoric of 2020–2021, offering no new reflections or lessons learned. However, we must not let the spirit of accountability fade—such a historic catastrophe requires a full accounting.
1. Was the Cover-Up Directed by Local or Central Authorities?
In the immediate wake of the Wuhan lockdown, calls for accountability were widespread. Local officials in Wuhan were the primary targets of public outrage. The first question people asked was: Why was the outbreak not disclosed to the public immediately? A vital piece of context is the case of Dr. Li Wenliang, who warned colleagues in a WeChat group on December 30, 2019, about a “SARS-like virus,” only to be summoned and reprimanded by Wuhan police four days later. Dr. Li died of the virus on February 7.
Here’s a review of the timeline. On the afternoon of January 27, 2020, Wuhan Mayor Zhou Xianwang admitted in a Chinese Central Television interview that the disclosure of the epidemic had not been timely. However, he then shifted the responsibility, stating: “Everyone needs to understand that because this is an infectious disease, it falls under the Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Law. It must be disclosed according to the law. As a local government official, I could only disclose the information once I had received it and been authorized to do so.”
On February 12, the official Wuhan website published an article (since deleted) titled “Why Not Give the Wuhan Mayor More Warmth as He Fights the Epidemic?” which revealed: “As early as December, when the outbreak occurred, Wuhan had already reported the situation to national health departments. An expert group also conducted an in-depth investigation in Wuhan and provided preliminary conclusions.”
On January 28, during a meeting with WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Xi Jinping stated that regarding the pandemic response, “I have been personally commanding and personally deploying resources.” The February 15 issue of the Communist Party mouthpiece Qiushi published the full text of Xi’s February 3 speech, in which he claimed he had issued requirements for epidemic control as early as the January 7 Politburo Standing Committee meeting. This suggests that by January 7 at the latest, the response was under Xi’s “personal command.”
Chinese politics is almost never transparent. Xi has never elaborated on what those January 7 instructions actually were, and the original Xinhua News Agency report on that meeting did not mention the virus at all. All this evidence suggests that the responsibility for concealing the outbreak lies with the central government, not the local authorities.
Following the 2003 SARS crisis, the Chinese government spent vast sums to establish a national monitoring system for infectious diseases and public health emergencies. Coronaviruses like COVID-19 were a priority for this system, which launched on April 1, 2004. Furthermore, the Chinese government established the “National Emergency Plan for Public Health Emergencies” in 2006. Had the government activated these mechanisms and taken action when the virus was first detected, the outbreak might have been nipped in the bud, potentially averting a global catastrophe.
2. Global Spread: Did the Chinese Government Mislead the World?
Looking back, it is evident that the Chinese government provided false information and inaccurate data at the start of the pandemic, which severely misled the WHO and foreign governments. Dr. Gauden Galea, the WHO representative in China at the time, noted that the WHO was entirely dependent on information reported by China—including the critical question of human-to-human transmission—and therefore failed to issue timely warnings. Deborah Birx, a leader of the U.S. coronavirus task force, remarked that the medical community interpreted Chinese data to mean the situation was serious but manageable, not a potential global pandemic.
When Wuhan was locked down on January 23, some argued that the world should have understood the gravity of the situation then. However, this ignores the fact that the Chinese government’s propaganda at the time insisted the lockdown was a massive sacrifice that had contained the virus within China, buying the world time while overseas cases remained under 1%. This narrative continued to mislead the international community. Even on January 24, The Lancet editor Richard Horton stated there was no need to panic, and the WHO advised against travel restrictions. When the U.S. government announced a flight ban in late January, China denounced the move as “unkind.” The world was effectively blinded by a combination of flawed data and state propaganda.
3. Six Years Later, the Origin of the Virus Remains Unsolved
Today, six years after the lockdown, we still do not know if the virus was a natural spillover or a laboratory leak, nor if it was natural or synthetic.
From the beginning of the outbreak, many suspected a laboratory leak. This suspicion was based on the fact that while the virus is believed to have originated in bats from Yunnan, the outbreak occurred in Wuhan—thousands of kilometers away from those bat habitats. Furthermore, the Wuhan Institute of Virology houses the world’s largest collection of bat virus samples. Since the outbreak began in Wuhan, the lab was a logical suspect. Scientists also noted that SARS-CoV-2 possesses a unique “furin cleavage site” in its spike protein, a feature not found in similar coronaviruses, and the Wuhan Institute of Virology had been conducting “gain-of-function” research related to such features.
In contrast to the 2003 SARS outbreak—where the animal source, civet cats, was identified in five months—no animal host has been found for COVID-19 after six years. The scientific community still has doubts and cannot rule out a lab leak. The Chinese government’s refusal to allow independent investigations and its suppression of information have only deepened these suspicions. What is certain, however, is that the Chinese government’s early concealment and dissemination of false data constituted a severe violation of the International Health Regulations, for which it must be held accountable.
4. The Enigma of China’s COVID-19 Death Toll
WHO data suggests that by mid-January 2026, approximately 7.1 million people globally had died from COVID-19. Meanwhile, the death toll reported by the Chinese government stands at only 120,000.
This figure of 120,000 is widely viewed as false. Former China CDC Chief Epidemiologist Wu Zunyou provided data that suggests a much higher number. In January 2023, Wu stated that 80% of China’s population had been infected following the December 2022 reopening. He later cited a case fatality rate (CFR) of 0.08% for that period. Based on these numbers—1.4 billion people × 80% infection rate × 0.08% CFR—the death toll for those two months alone would be roughly 896,000.
Even 896,000 is likely an underestimate. The 0.08% CFR was an international average, but China’s situation was unique. China’s domestic vaccines were less effective, and because of the zero-COVID policy, the population lacked the hybrid immunity found in other countries where people had already been infected. For most Chinese citizens, the late 2022 wave was their first exposure to the virus. Consequently, the death toll was likely several times higher than the international average.
Because reliable data is unavailable, researchers often use “excess deaths” (the number of deaths above the historical average) as a proxy. While not all excess deaths are directly caused by COVID-19—some result from medical shortages, chronic disease neglect, or economic hardship—they provide the most accurate estimate of a pandemic’s impact.
In China, cremation data is a primary source for estimating deaths, as burial is largely prohibited. While many rural deaths during the peak of the pandemic went unrecorded due to overwhelmed crematoria or local burials, the available records are still telling.
By April 2023, The Wall Street Journal noted that official cremation reports from over 30 Chinese regions had either been deleted or were no longer being updated. However, a few scattered data points were leaked before being censored:
1. Zhejiang Province: In Q1 2023, cremations reached 171,000—a 72.7% increase over the previous year.
2. Changyuan, Henan: In the first half of 2023, cremations rose by 78.3% compared to the same period in 2022.
3. Huidong, Guangdong: Cremations from January to May 2023 increased by 114% year-on-year.
Extrapolating from these leaked figures, the number of excess deaths in China during the biggest wave from late 2022 to early 2023 was at least 4 million, and perhaps as high as 5.95 million. When combined with deaths from the preceding three years, the total represents a staggering loss of life that likely ranks among the highest in the world.
Many countries in the world botched handling the COVID-19 outbreak, but China’s case is still unique. The virus originated in China; thus, clarifying its origins should be a moral obligation of the Chinese government. In addition, the Chinese government had a unique opportunity to avoid the mass death found in other countries because of its initially successful lockdown strategy. However, its reckless decision to not take preventive measures such as using effective mRNA vaccines led to untold misery and a high death toll. Despite the difficulty, Chinese civil society must still push for a reckoning.
Recommended archive:
Hu Ping: The COVID-19 Catastrophe: A Disaster That Could Have Been Entirely Avoided
[This article first appears on China Unofficial Archives. When reposting, please ensure that the following is included at the beginning of the reposted text: “This article was first published by the China Unofficial Archives,” accompanied by a link to the original article on the China Unofficial Archives website or Substack.]
[The views expressed by the author of this article do not necessarily reflect the position of the China Unofficial Archives.]
好文
Thanks for this rare writer unknown to me and I suspect most of us in the West.
I hope Hu Ping can stay safe and free.